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Abstract: The present paper examines the capital structure adjustment dynamics of 
listed non-financial corporations in seven East Asian countries during 1994-2002. 
Compared to firms in the least affected countries, average leverages were much 
higher among firms in the worst affected countries while the average speeds of 
adjustment were lower. This general ranking is robust to various alternative 
specifications and sample selections. We argue that this pattern is closely linked to 
weaknesses in regulatory environment and lack of access to alternative sources of 
finance in the worst affected countries.  
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Evolution of Capital Structure in East Asia –  
Corporate Inertia or Endeavours? 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent Asian crisis literature has attributed the problems of over-borrowing and over 
investment among the East Asian corporations to the moral hazard of bad loans in 
capital markets (e.g., see Corsetti et al. 1999a). These issues have primarily been 
analysed in the context of an aggregate economy (that sometimes relied on anecdotal 
evidence as well); there is however little, if any, micro-economic firm-level evidence 
to corroborate these views. While the existing corporate finance literature (e.g., 
Claessens, et al., 2000; Driffield and Pal, 2001, Driffield, Mahambare and Pal, 2007) 
highlights aspects of excessive leverage and overinvestment, separation of control 
from management, weak legal rules and enforcement that left East Asian corporations 
vulnerable to an economic downturn, there is little/no understanding as to how these 
East Asian corporations have chosen, and subsequently adjusted (partially/fully) their 
debt ratios during this period. It is still not clear as to how behaviour of firms in 
Singapore, Taiwan or Hong Kong differed in this respect from their counterparts in 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia or Thailand or for that matter whether these firms learnt 
from their mistakes during the crisis period and altered their adjustment behaviour 
subsequently. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these unanswered 
questions. The paper investigates the choice of capital structure and also its evolution 
among large non-financial East Asian corporations in a group of seven countries 
(incorporating the worst and the least affected countries) during 1995-2002, which 
included the last Asian crisis of 1997-98. It is an important exercise because it could 
improve our understanding of the crisis. A slow pace of adjustment (even in the face 
of over-borrowing and deteriorating assets position) could, for example, lend support   2
to the moral hazard view of the crisis being the result of lack of monitoring and/or 
prudential regulation of bank dominated system of finance in the region. Our choice 
of sample countries also allows the comparison of corporate behaviour in the least and 
the worst affected countries, and thus identify ways to avert the worst of the crisis. 
Our choice of sample period also allows us to compare and contrast the corporate 
behaviour, especially those financially distressed before, during and after the crisis 
and thus to detect signs of recovery, if any. 
While there is very little understanding of optimal capital structure and its 
dynamics in developing and transition countries (with the exception of Booth et al. 
2001), there is a rather well-developed literature on the dynamics of capital structure 
adjustment among the US corporations. A common theme in this strand of the 
literature is that if a firm’s actual leverage deviates from the desired (or optimal) 
leverage, it will undertake some adjustment process to attain the optimal leverage. 
However, capital market imperfections may prevent an instantaneous adjustment of 
the actual leverage to the desired level, (for example, see Fischer, et al, 1989; Leyland 
1998). This highlights the controversy about the speed of adjustment, much of which 
could be attributed to methodologies employed. For example, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) used OLS and Fama-McBeth methods to obtain average adjustment rates 
across various sub-samples employed (which clearly ignores the impact of firm-level 
heterogeneities) and found firms typically close less than 12% of the gap between the 
actual and the target leverage each year. Flannery and Rangan (2006) used panel data 
to analyse the adjustment behaviour of firms using standard fixed effects estimates 
though their analysis did not appropriately address the endogeneity problems. They 
argued that a typical firm converges on its long run target at more than 30% a year, a 
speed that is more than double than the previous estimates. In contrast, Lemmon et al.   3
(2006) found that capital structure is remarkably stable over time for both publicly 
traded and privately held firms and argue that high speed of adjustment in Flannery 
and Rangan may be attributed to firm entry and exit.  
Our study focuses on large listed non-financial firms in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand over a period of 1995-2002, the countries worst affected by 
the last crisis of 1997-98, compared with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan that 
were relatively unaffected by the crisis. Clearly these Asian countries are different 
from the US where bank-based system of finance still predominates. There is however 
little understanding of the operation of credit markets and adjustment of corporate 
capital structure in these countries, and this paper aims to fill in this gap of the 
literature. The sample countries included are not only at different stages of capital 
market developments (see for example Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1995; 
1999), but are also sufficiently different in terms of the institutional environment (see 
Table 1 and further discussion in section 1). As such the choice of the sample 
countries offers interesting contrasts and thus justifies our approach of analysing 
corporate behaviour separately for each country rather than pooling them together.  
We use Worldscope firm-level data from listed non-financial firms in the 
selected countries over a period of 1994-2002 that has been used elsewhere (e.g., see 
Claessens et al. 2000). As we explain later (see section 2), the choice of the sample 
period 1995-2002 has been dictated by the missing observations for a number of years 
that we could not retain in a dynamic analysis of this type. Although in view of the 
longer time span used in the related capital structure literature pertaining to the US 
corporations, sample period 1995-2002 appears to be a relatively short, this eventful 
period allows us to analyse the corporate capital structure behaviour of East Asian   4
corporations before, during and after the last Asian crisis of 1997-98. As such, the 
analysis offers an explanation of the crisis and also recovery in its aftermath.  
Existing capital structure literature while quite well-developed, tend to 
predominantly assume that all firms have a common speed of adjustment (with the 
exception of Jalivand and Harris, 1984). Our analysis in stead highlights aspects of 
heterogeneity among sample firms, based for example on different sizes, leverage and 
debt composition. As such, we allow firms to have firm- and time-varying speeds of 
adjustment, and compare these flexible estimates with estimates of more conventional 
models commonly available in the literature. Unlike OLS and SUR estimates on 
pooled data used by Jalivand and Harris (1984), we employ Generalised Methods of 
Moments (GMM) to estimate firm and time-varying speeds of adjustment from panel 
data; GMM takes account of the endogeneity bias arising from the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variable. Third, the previous work seeking to determine speed estimates 
generally assumes a smooth optimal adjustment mechanism over the period of 
adjustment, in that a firm will adjust to target leverage only when the benefits of 
doing so exceeds the costs involved. However, this type of optimal adjustment may 
not be possible for financially distressed firms during the crisis time; the latter may 
require sudden (as opposed to smooth) adjustment. In the light of the available 
information, we use liquidity ratios (ratio of cash flow to current liability) to identify 
the financially distressed firms and examine if their adjustment behaviour has been 
different from the full sample, which remains hitherto unexplored in the crisis 
literature. Finally, we compare the firm- and time-varying speed estimates with 
alternative estimates available in the literature and also check the robustness of these 
estimates by considering its variation across firm size, leverage size, composition of 
debt. We also provide alternative estimates using net leverage (i.e., leverage net of   5
cash flow); the advantage of the latter is that it allows us to distinguish the behaviour 
of financially constrained firms from others and is also nicely linked to the measure of 
financial distress that we use.  
While the average leverages were much higher among firms in the worst-
affected countries, there is evidence from our analysis that their average speeds of 
adjustment were lower than those in the least affected countries. This general ranking 
is robust to various alternative specifications of the sample and also the leverage 
measures used. We argue that this pattern is closely related to weak institutional 
framework for debt issuance, monitoring and recovery in the worst affected countries. 
However, even in a given institutional set-up, more prudent behaviour paid off, in that 
firms with zero/lower debt (relative to their assets) or those with more cash flow could 
adjust faster and thus avoid the worst of the crisis. Access to market-based finance 
was also important, especially for firms in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, who 
could adjust more speedily and could thus avert the worst of the crisis. While better 
institutions and access to market-based finance helped Malaysian firms to maintain 
relatively lower leverages, it was not effective enough to ensure speedy capital 
structure adjustment. The paper concludes with a summary of our findings. 
 
 
2.   DATA AND INITIAL ANALYSIS 
The analysis is based on the Worldscope firm-level data for all listed non-financial 
firms in the sample countries, which has been widely used (e.g., see Claessens et al. 
2000; Ulbricht and Weiner, 2005). The number of firms and total observations in each 
country over the sample period 1995-2002 are summarised in Table 3.  
   6
 
2.1. Financial Crisis and Capita Structure in East Asia 
There is now a growing consensus that the financial fragility in these economies was 
one of the main factors for the last Asian crisis of 1997-98. This has been highlighted 
in ineffective financial supervision and regulation in the context of countries' financial 
sector liberalizations. Capital account liberalization was poorly sequenced, 
encouraging short-term borrowing, while limited exchange rate flexibility led 
borrowers to underestimate the exchange rate risk. Monetary policies allowed 
domestic credit to expand at a breakneck pace. But if banks and corporations in these 
countries borrowed imprudently, foreign lenders also lent imprudently, possibly 
reflecting sloppy risk management, perceptions of implicit government guarantees, 
and the incomplete information available. To a large extent, this was the result of a 
long spell of unprecedented economic growth in East Asia in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Strong growth and generally prudent macroeconomic management, as seen in 
continuous public sector fiscal surpluses over the same period, had attracted large 
capital inflows, much of them being short-term. 
In the light of our available data, we experimented with various leverage 
measures. First we tried to construct a ratio of total debt to market value of equity (as 
we did not have book value of equity); this was however problematic for the 
estimation of the dynamic model as many firms had negative equity values during the 
crisis period. So the capital structure in our analysis is measured by the ratio of total 
debt (short and long-term) to total assets. Following Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) we also construct a net leverage (leverage net of cash flows) 
measure. Given that Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) found that cash flows 
are sensitive to cash savings only for financially constrained firms, it is expected that   7
net leverage could be more relevant for financially constrained firms during the crisis 
period. This allows us to examine the robustness of our speed estimates using 
alternative leverage measures. Similar measures are used in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), though they considered a group of firms in the west. Booth et al. (2001) 
included some of the countries used in our study though they used debt-equity ratio as 
the relevant measure of leverage (see Table 1). 
A comparison of mean leverages across the sample countries (see Table 1) is 
quite revealing. Among the worst affected countries, Malaysia has the lowest mean 
leverage (0.37) while the other three countries have comparable figures (around 0.47). 
In contrast, the average is about half in the least affected countries (Hong Kong: 0.24, 
Singapore: 0.22 and Taiwan: 0.26). To a large extent, these differences are consistent 
with the underlying differences in the institutional characteristics, especially those 
relating to legal/monitoring environment in the region (Table 1). Malaysia had 
developed more effective bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, as well as stronger 
supervisory capacity even before the crisis and the banking sector was also well 
capitalized compared with the other affected countries. This is reflected in the better 
scores for the rule of the law, creditors’ rights, and shareholders’ rights in Malaysia 
(compared to other sample countries). In contrast, Indonesia seems to be at the bottom 
end of the scale in all these respects. As a result, Indonesia's progress in corporate 
restructuring has been disappointing. The three least affected countries have 
comparatively well functioning institutional frameworks, more comparable with the 
developed countries, and firms in these countries had significantly lower leverages. 
Lower leverages in all the least affected countries and Malaysia among the worst 
affected countries could also be a reflection of access to alternative market based 
financings. This is reflected in higher scores of market capitalisation and total value   8
traded (as shares of GDP) in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore (we could not find 
the comparable figure for Taiwan though).   
 
2.2. Evolution of capital structure 
It is also important to examine the evolution of capital structure over time. In order to 
do this we characterise our time frame as three sub-periods: (a) pre-crisis period 1994-
96; (b) crisis period 1997-98 and (c) post-crisis period 1999-02. Average total debt, 
total assets and debt ratios over these sub-periods across small, medium and large 
firms in the sample countries are shown in Table 2. A few observations are 
noteworthy: (i) larger sample firms tend to have more debt, on an average, in all the 
sample countries across all three sub-periods. This is also reflected in significant and 
positive correlation between firm size and leverage in four out of seven sample 
countries (with the exception of Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan where the 
correlation coefficients are positive, but not significant). (ii) There are some zero-debt 
firms in each of the sample countries. While the proportion of firms with zero debt is 
fairly limited across the sample countries, the relative proportion is the highest in 
Malaysia (7%) and lowest in Korea (1%). Correlation between firm size and leverage 
holds even if we exclude the zero-debt firms (with the exception of Malaysia). (iii)  
For firms of a given size, average leverages are generally stable across the sub-periods 
among firms in the least affected countries while these increased significantly during 
the crisis period for firms in the worst affected countries (Malaysia being an 
exception). (iv) Increases in leverages in the crisis period are generally associated 
with an increase in average leverage, but decrease in assets among firms in the worst 
affected countries, thus highlighting the aspect of imprudent debt management.   9
We also examine the quartile distribution of leverage for each year during the 
sample period. In particular, we focus on the period 1995-2002 (see Table 3), as this 
is used for our dynamic estimation (see sections 3 and 4). This allows us to classify 
firms into four quartiles of leverages. Clearly debt ratios fluctuate somewhat for firms 
in the worst affected countries over this period, especially among those in the top 
quartile and in all these cases there has been a peak in the crisis years 1997-98. More 
interestingly, firms in the top leverage quartiles in the worst affected countries tend to 
experience higher fluctuation (i.e., standard deviation) over the sample period. 
Taken together there is evidence that larger firms tend to be more leveraged, 
especially in the worst affected countries (with the exception of Malaysia). The latter 
seems to highlight their easier access to capital. Effective interest rates (i.e., total 
interest expenses as a ratio of total debt) are potentially important determinants of the 
firm’s ability to continue borrowing, and thus to engage in further investment 
projects. The difference in the mean effective interest rate between firms in the top 
leverage quartile and all other firms (see Appendix Table A2) is significant for all the 
countries; note however that the difference is the smallest for Taiwan and Singapore 
(two of the least affected countries in our sample). This observation is in line with 
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006). However unlike Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006), the 
relationship between firm size and leverage remains positive and significant for all 
sample countries except Malaysia (where the relationship turns out to be significantly 
negative), as we exclude the zero-debt firms. 
  Table 4 shows the average share of long-term to total debt in the sample 
countries which in turn reflects the implicit share of short-term debt to total debt. 
Clearly, the average share of long-term (short-term) debt is the highest (lowest) in 
Korea and the country had also the lowest proportion (3%) of firms relying only on   10
short-term debt. These rates are however quite comparable among the other sample 
countries (ranging between 0.60-0.65). In section 4, we shall analyse the implications 
of the composition of debt on the average speed of adjustment.  
Claessens et al. (2002) highlight the aspects of ownership and its link to firm 
value. Elsewhere (Driffield et al. 2007) we have shown that the link between 
ownership and firm value in East Asian corporations is closely linked to the link 
between ownership and leverage. However this ownership information is available 
only for the year 1996 and there have been significant changes in ownership in the 
sample countries, especially after the crisis. Consequently, we cannot use this 
information in the present context. 
 
 
3.   Methodology 
We start with the simple partial adjustment model that assumes a common speed of 
adjustment for all firms, used by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Lemmon et al. 
(2006), among others. However, in view of the restriction of common speed first 
noted by Jalivand and Harris (1984), we extend theses conventional models and 
estimate partial adjustment models with (a) firm-specific and (b) firm- and time- 
varying speeds of adjustment.  
 
3.1. Partial adjustment models 
Let the optimal leverage of a firm i at time t be  . In the absence of any market 
imperfection, and with instantaneous adjustment, the observed leverage  of firm i at 
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for example, due to agency and/or transaction costs,  ; alternatively, if loans 
are cheap and easily available, adjustment would be relatively costless  (e.g., for many 
East Asian corporations in our sample),  . In either case, firms may fail to 
adjust completely to the optimal level within one period of time.  
*
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*
it it L L >
it ε + − ) 1
*
it L
In these circumstances, the movement of leverage over time becomes a partial 
adjustment process, of the form:   
it it it it it L L L L L β α − + = − = ∆ − ( *
1     (Model  1) 
Thus changes in leverage depend on its adjustment from period t-1 towards the 
optimum in period t, where β is the speed of adjustment. If β = 1, any firm will adjust 
its leverage fully to its optimum from period t-1 to period t (i.e., within one period). 
If, however, β <1, then the adjustment from year t-1 to t falls short of the adjustment 
required to attain the target. In contrast, β > 1 would indicate evidence of over-
adjustment within the period. The most apparent effects of adjustment costs would 
therefore be periods of inactivity as agents wait for the benefits of adjustment to 
outweigh the costs (for example, firms wait until the increased tax benefits offset the 
debt issuance costs in Fisher et al. ,1989), thus resulting in slower speed of adjustment 
(β <1). 
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Instead of estimating the first difference model (1), following Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), for example, we employ model (2) to estimate a model of the level of debt   12
ratios. This model assumes that the optimal debt ratio L
* is determined by including a 
set of lagged explanatory variable Xit-1. The vector of explanatory variables includes a 
number of firm characteristics commonly used in the literature (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Thus in addition to the lagged leverage, 
we include firm size measured by the log of total assets (larger firms tend to operate 
with more depreciation), share of fixed assets in total assets (firms with greater 
tangible assets tend to have higher debt capacity), depreciation as a proportion of total 
assets (firms with more depreciation have less need for the interest reductions 
associated with debt financing), Tobin’s Q (i.e., a ratio of firm’s market value to total 
assets as a proxy for more attractive future growth options which in turn may lower 
leverage) and research and development expenses as a share of total assets (firms with 
more intangible assets may prefer to have more equity rather than debt, though this 
variable is missing for two countries). We however did not include the share of EBIT 
in total assets because it is likely to be endogenous, and collinear with Q. We also 
include firms’ lagged industry median debt ratio to control for industry characteristics 
not captured by other explanatory variables. The analysis of capital structure 
dynamics focuses on the coefficient of lagged dependent variable and obtaining the 
speed of adjustment β from the estimate of (1-β). This allows one to compare 
estimates of models (1) and (2). Means and standard deviations of all explanatory 
variables for the full sample are summarised in the Appendix Table A1. 
  Lemmon et al. (2006) employ a partial adjustment model similar to (2), but 
instead of lagged leverage as an explanatory variable, they include firm’s initial 
leverage as the relevant model. We replicate this model with our data, based on the 
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  Flannery and Rangan (2006) however are concerned with explaining changes 
in leverage within a relatively static model, where changes in leverage are related to a 
set of explanatory variables in levels. We extend this in two ways. Firstly, as 
explained in detail below, we allow the speed of adjustment to vary across firms, and 
also over time. Secondly, we also incorporate the dynamics of the explanatory 
variables. There has been a debate in recent years concerning the extent to which 
firms do indeed target their leverage, see for example Welch (2004). However, what 
is clear from this literature, is that the extent to which the evidence from work such as 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) supports a partial adjustment process in leverage, such 
that leverage responds to not only the difference between the actual and optimal 
levels, but also to changes in the observed long run fundamentals. Firstly, firms, 
perceiving themselves in disequilibrium will adjust, in any situation where the benefit 
exceeds the cost. This can be captured by the lagged difference between optimal and 
actual leverage. However, these models ignore a second point, which is that leverage 
may also move if there are contemporaneous changes in the explanatory variables. 
Most work in this area finds that Q ratios are inversely related to leverage. If therefore 
a firm undertook a series of investments and if it subsequently were well regarded by 
equity markets, then the firm may well find it optimal to reduce leverage. This is 
independent of the difference between L and L* in the previous period, but is 
determined by movements in L* in the current period. Ignoring this second stimulus 
for adjustment may cause bias in any estimate of the speed of adjustment attributed to 
the first form of adjustment alone. This then leads to a class of models that are   14
common in factor demand modelling (see for example Hamermesh, 1995) that has 
this additional adjustment term.  
We therefore consider an extended version of (1) as well that includes a 
second adjustment parameter γ measuring the response of the debt ratio to the annual 
change in the optimal leverage over the current period (∆ )   *
it L





1    (Model 3) 
It is clear therefore that there is a crucial difference between models (1), and (3); the 
standard model (1) ignores the effects of changes in the optimal leverage from the 
previous to the current period and only focuses on the adjustment of lagged leverage 
towards the previous optimal level. Thus Model 3 is an augmented version of Model 
1. The significance or otherwise of the additional term is then an empirical issue that 
we explore here. 
Note however that estimating the speed of adjustment using a common β for 
all firms over a period of time 1995-2002 is potentially problematic because it 
imposes a restriction that all sample firms (with different characteristics) tend to 
adjust with the same speed, even when firms are clearly heterogeneous in terms of its 
characteristics. Perhaps this explains why firm-specific unobserved factors play such 
an important role in Lemmon et al. (2006), and in general why much of the literature 
discussed above finds such varying results in identifying any adjustment process and 
the implied speed. We therefore seek to capture this heterogeneity with a vector of 
firm specific characteristics, and to allow for the possibility that βit ≠ β and test the 
validity of alternative hypotheses in our samples: (a) βit = βi for all i, so that in stead 
of a common speed of adjustment, there is a firm-specific (but time invariant) speed 
of adjustment – in other words, for any firm i, the speed βi does not change from one   15
year to the next during the sample period 1995-2002. Based on the wider literature of 
firm level adjustment of activities such as capital investment as well as leverage, the 
variables included are stock returns, debt coverage, firm size and Q ratio. In addition, 
we also include a firm-specific binary variable Di that takes a value 1 if  for at 
least 5 of the sample years and zero otherwise. Crucially, this incorporates some non 
linearity into the model, identifying whether the adjustment speed is higher or lower 
among firms who tend to borrow more or less than the optimal. Accordingly, we 
modify model (3) as follows: 
*
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Thus, we estimate a partial adjustment model where the firm-specific speed of 
adjustment βi depends on firm-level average values of Tobin’s Q, firm size, debt 
coverage ratio and stock returns over the sample period.  
(b) Finally we allow for the possibility that the speed of adjustment βit would 
vary not only across firms, but also over time, thus giving rise to a fully flexible 
model as follows:  
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   (Model 5) 
In contrast to model (4), variables explaining βit vary across firms and also over time; 
note also that Dit takes a value of 1 if   and zero otherwise.  *
it it L L <
Thus, model (5) allows for the possibility that the potential speed of 
adjustment will differ among firms and also over time, depending on whether the   16
leverage is more or less than its equilibrium level (Dit) and the vector of other firm- 
and time-specific variables, including the distress it is operating under. Both models 
(4) and (5) assume that the possible determinants of the speed of adjustment (βi, βit) 
include firm size (SALES) and profitability (Q) of sample firms. Larger and more 
profitable firms are more likely to have more flexibility in adjusting the actual 
leverage towards the optimal leverage and therefore may have a higher speed of 
adjustment. It is expected that firms with higher stock returns may find it easier to 
adjust DE towards the optimum because they could substitute equity finance for debt 
finance. In order to control for this financial effect, we include annual stock returns 
(SR). Finally, we experiment with some conventional measures of distress that the 
firm is operating under, namely, cash flow as a share of current liability, interest 
coverage (interest payments as a share of cash flow) as well as debt coverage ratio 
(DC) defined as current total debt as a share of cash flow and include debt coverage in 
the final specification as this yields the best set of estimates (see Appendix Table A1 
for descriptive statistics).  
Thus our methodology goes beyond the existing empirical literature on capital 
structure dynamics; this approach not only allows us to derive firm and/or time-
specific speed of adjustment, but also to identify the factors determining the speed of 
adjustment.  
3.2. Estimation method 
In this subsection, we discuss the estimation method used for various models (1)-(5) 
described in section 3.1. 
3.2.1. Determination of optimal leverage 
Much of the previous literature in this area derives an estimate for the long 
run, or optimal level of leverage, typically based on a static version of (2). Typically   17
these employ simple cross sectional analysis, or panel data with fixed effects. This 
ignores the importance of past levels in explaining the current level, and therefore we 
employ a dynamic specification, employing the Blundell-Bond method discussed 
below.  
If leverage levels are relatively stable over time, then a simple average of the 
fitted values for each firm across time may provide the best estimate of optimal 
leverage. However, if the data are more volatile (as in our case), and firms are 
responding to changes in the explanatory variables, or to other shocks, then allowing 
the optimal level to vary year to year, and using the fitted values on an annual basis is 
more appropriate, and this is what we do here. Once one allows for this, the best 
estimate of “optimal leverage” is the fitted value derived from this estimation, rather 
than a more standard least squares fixed effect model. These results from the 
estimation of the optimal leverage model are presented in Table 3, and discussed in 
detail below. 
As Strebulaev (2007) points out, models seeking to explain optimum levels of 
leverage may be biased if a high proportion of firms are a long way away from their 
optimal level. This argument is similar to that made by Welch (2004) in that 
identifying any such target or optimal leverage can be problematic. Dynamic panel 
models can to an extent address this, but as the referee points out, there is no 
definitive test for this, or the parsimonious form of the final model. However, the fit 
of our models is good; in general the lagged dependent variable is significant. In 
addition, it is encouraging that testing the models for various sub-samples, based on 
levels of leverage, firm size, amount of debt, value of assets etc. offers robust results; 
so it appears that this is not a significant problem. 
   18
3.2.2. Level estimates 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimated model (2) using fixed effects with various 
instrumental variable estimates. However, as indicated by Lemmon et al. (2006), one 
needs to use a GMM estimator such as the one developed by Blundell-Bond (B-B 
hereafter) to address the endogeneity problem. The final consideration with panel data 
is that the standard errors are potentially biased downwards if the data are correlated 
through time. As such one has to allow for this “clustering” on individuals to allow 
for otherwise downward bias on the standard errors. For further discussion see 
Wooldridge (2002) or Froot (1989).  
A consideration with data and models such as the one presented here is the 
extent to which lags (and particularly lags of differences) are valid instruments, 
particularly when considering lags of 5 years or more. The use of “initial” variables – 
i.e., the first year for which one has data, are designed to reflect long run differences 
between firms. Indeed some have argued that these variables are determined outside 
of the model, and are therefore exogenous. This can be applied where one has a very 
long panel, and as such the time differences between the period under consideration 
and the initial period is very long. However, in shorter panels, one still has the 
possibility of this being a pre-determined variable a la Arrellano and Bond (1988, 
1992), and therefore must be tested at least for weak exogeneity. We do this, and the 
hypothesis of exogeneity is strongly rejected. Indeed, given that Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) obtain t values of over 100 for the significance of this variable, this may be a 
common problem in such data. As such, we are left with three alternatives: (a) assume 
this variable reflects merely firm level differences, treat it as exogenous and proceed 
with caution. (b) Shorten the time period under review, and instrument with additional 
lags. (c) Find an alternative instrument. We employ the third option; we use the fitted   19
value from the levels regression for the initial year. This is only done for model 2 – 
the model with the initial conditions variable. For all other models, we proceed in a 
relatively standard manner. We simply use all available lags within the GMM 
framework. It is therefore crucial to be careful in testing for instrument validity in 
each of the models, and Sargan tests for instrument validity are presented in the 
results tables. However, during the crisis period, the data are quite volatile, and the 
standard test of instrument validity rejects their use. As a result, all available lags are 
used for all years except for the crisis period where the values of leverage are not 
valid instruments for the final year of the samples.  
There remains the possibility that the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable has an upward bias if the panel data exhibits significant 
heterogeneity (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). There is no definitive test for this, but a 
reasonable test with these data is to allow for interaction dummies with the lagged 
dependent variable. Interacting the lagged dependent variables with a vector of 
industry level dummy variables allows the parameter on the lagged dependent 
variable to vary across industries. However, standard specification tests reject the 
inclusion of such variables, suggesting that heterogeneity is not a problem in these 
data. We also test for 1
st and 2
nd order serial correlation: (Doornik et al. 2002). The 
appropriate AR1 and AR2 tests are then based on average residual autovariances, 
which are asymptotically distributed N(0,1). Finally, as a further test of the GMM 
system estimator, we report the Sargan difference test. In none of our regressions are 
the additional moment conditions suggested by the GMM systems estimator rejected. 
 
3.2.3. First difference estimates 
Note however that models (1) and (3-5) all have the changes in leverage as the   20
dependent variable. We use a simpler generalised method of moments instrumental 
variable (GMM-IV) to estimate these equations. This employs the estimation 
procedure outlined in some detail by Sevestre and Trognon (1996). This approach is 
common for example in labour demand modelling, where a non-linear adjustment 
process is assumed. For further discussion of this, see Hamermesh (1995). Again a 
crucial issue is the validity of instruments, and the question of whether lags are valid 
instruments in periods of volatility, especially with differenced data. In general, all 
available lags are used as instruments, with the exception of Malaysia where this is 
rejected, and the lag length was limited to two years, and for Indonesia where the 
crisis period values are not used as instruments. The Sargan tests for instrument 
validity as well as the AR1 and AR2 tests are presented in the tables. The 
methodology is similar for equation (4) though in this case as the firm specific 
variables take the value of their long run levels, these are treated as exogenous.  
There is a good deal of heterogeneity across countries, particularly in terms of 
capital market liberalisation and institutional development (see Table 1), and 
relationships between the corporate and financial sectors. The results also highlight 
significant differences in our results across countries. We experimented with pooled 
cross country models, but on both empirical and theoretical grounds these are 
unsatisfactory. 
 
4.   Analysis of Results 
4.1. Level estimates of model 2 and 2a 
The results shown in Table 5 reveal that firms with higher lagged leverage tend to 
have higher current leverage. There is also indication that relative to the existing US 
evidence, the underlying speed of adjustment is high, especially in all the worst   21
affected countries including Korea (0.81), Indonesia (0.90), Malaysia (0.87) and 
Thailand (0.77). The estimated coefficient remains insignificant for Taiwan while 
speed estimates are respectively 0.87 and 0.81 in Hong Kong and Singapore, two of 
the least affected countries.  
 
Effects of historical leverage 
Next, following Lemmon et al. (2006), we replace the lagged dependent variable by 
its initial value in the year 1995 and estimate model (2a). These estimates are 
presented in Table 6. Note that the coefficient of the initial debt ratio is not significant 
for Indonesia, Korea and Singapore. For the rest of the countries however the 
coefficient of initial leverage is significant and positive (as in Lemmon et al., 2006) so 
that firms with higher initial leverage tend to be associated with higher speed of 
adjustment. As with estimates of model (2), coefficient estimates of industry median 
leverage are positive for 6 out of 7 sample countries, again exhibiting some evidence 
of industry effects. 
 
4.2. Estimates of first differences models 1 and 3 
Estimates in panel b of Table 7 (extended model 3) suggest that firms do respond to 
disequilibrium in the short term in that the coefficients on β are large; but that 
changes in the contemporaneous long run level of leverage only feed through to 
changes in the observed level of leverage in four of the seven countries. It is perhaps 
significant that the 3 countries most heavily hit by the crisis do not adjust if the long 
run level changes, suggesting that changes in the level of debt are not sensitive to 
changes in the underlying conditions of the economy.    22
It is also informative to test whether β ≠ 1. Tests for this illustrate that the 
speed of adjustment is significantly less than one for Korea and Malaysia, while the 
value for Hong Kong is just over 80% but not significantly different from 1. The 
value for Thailand is close to 1, and it is borderline significantly different from 1, at 
least in the more restricted model. Thus among the worst affected countries, Malaysia 
and Korea have lower speeds (i.e., higher costs) of adjustment; while there is evidence 
of near instantaneous adjustment in Thailand (within one calendar year). It is also 
imperative to compare the level (Table 5) and first difference estimates (Table 7) in 
this context. Clearly these two sets of estimates are somewhat different (the difference 
being minimum for Taiwan and maximum for Malaysia); the difference could perhaps 
be attributed to the natural elimination of the unobserved firm-level heterogeneity in 
first difference estimates presented in Table 7.   
What is striking however are the very high rates of adjustment among East 
Asian firms (compared with those available from some recent US studies). These 
differences may highlight the low costs of adjustment in East Asia where bank-based 
financing dominates. A comparison of effective interest rate (Table A2) however 
suggests that it is only true for larger firms with very high leverage thought not for all 
firms in our sample. In order to examine the robustness of these speed estimates, we 
relax the common speed assumption of conventional partial adjustment models, and in 
stead examine the nature of speed estimates in more flexible models (4) and (5).  
 
4.3. Beyond common speed of adjustment: Estimates of models 4 and 5 
We now consider the estimates of speed of adjustment obtained from the more 
flexible partial adjustment models (4) and (5) that allow for heterogeneity in the speed 
of adjustment among firms and also over time. These estimates are summarised in   23
Tables 8 and 9 respectively. The results across tables 8 and 9 are relatively similar, 
though not surprisingly the standard errors are larger for the time invariant firm 
specific estimates of model 4.  
An important variable here is the D term. If Lit
* > Lit, then one would expect 
that the adjustment process should be faster, in that firms with excess debt should 
adjust more quickly. However, among the worst affected countries, this is found to be 
so only for Malaysia (the country with the most rigorous institutions in place), while 
the process is slower for firms in Korea and Thailand. Higher average Q tends to 
increase speed of adjustment in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, 3 out of four of the 
worst affected countries. Also, the estimate of γ is significant in three out of four 
worst affected sample countries and in all cases the estimates are positive (also note 
that estimates of γ are different from those in the common speed model, see Table 7).   
  Finally, we consider the estimates of the fully flexible model (5) presented in 
Table 9. Compared with results presented in Table 8, estimates in Table 9 highlight 
some important differences. First, the coefficient estimate of Di is negative and 
significant for all the worst affected countries, thus suggesting slower movement 
towards the optimum even among firms with excessive debt. Second, unlike firm-
specific estimates (Table 8), estimates from model (5) in Table 9 identify significance 
of sales, debt coverage and stock returns for at least three out of the seven sample 
countries. Also coefficient of Q turns out to be positive when significant.  
 
4.4. Comparison of alternative models 
Allowing the speeds to differ firstly across firms, and then also across time, 
significantly improves the fit of model 5. This is perhaps not surprising, but an issue 
seldom discussed elsewhere in the literature. In order to facilitate this comparison, we   24
employ the most reliable measure of goodness of fit for GMM models, which is the 
square of the correlation between the actual and fitted values. For a first difference 
model, these are very high, indicating that these models explain a high proportion of 
the variation in the change in leverage. 
There are no formal “goodness of fit” tests for the GMM estimator, though the 
crucial comparison here from an empirical perspective is the comparison of model 5 
and model 3, that is, the addition of the γ∆X term. Formally, the appropriate test for 
this is simply the t test on the γ term. This term is significant in 4 cases, suggesting 
that overall the change in the underlying determinants of leverage does impact on 
changes in leverage directly. There are however clearly differences across countries, 
suggesting that the addition of the terms remains an empirical issue. The extent to 
which the significance of this term differs is indicative of the extent to which firms 
adjust to changes in long run fundamentals. Clearly, in the case of Malaysia, there is 
no such effect, while the effect is weak for Indonesia and Thailand. While it may be 
argued that model (5) is the most appropriate general specification, some firms (or 
indeed countries) are unable to respond to changes in this manner.  
Finally, we compare the residual sum of squares of the estimates obtained 
from models 3, 4 and 5 (see Appendix Table A3). While none of the estimations 
presented here are designed to minimise the sum of squares as part of the estimation, 
it is still informative to compare the extent to which the various models used here 
explain the speed of adjustment of the firms concerned. Columns (3) and (5) 
summarise the percentage reduction in residual sum of squares (SSR) for models 4 
and 5 (relative to benchmark case model 3) for all the sample countries. Clearly the 
differences across firms in different sample countries are big, but the general trend is 
quite pronounced: the average percentage reduction (for all countries taken together)   25
is about 12.8% when we consider model (4), but it is almost double (nearly 22%) 
when we use firm- and time- varying speed model (5).  
 
4.5. Inter-country differences in the speed of adjustment 
Table 10 summarises the full sample average estimates of speed of adjustment 
obtained from alternative models. In particular, we now compare the common speed 
estimates β (obtained from estimation of model 3) with the corresponding estimates of 
βi obtained from model 4 and βit obtained from model 5. Clearly, firm-specific 
average speed estimates βi's (derived from model 4) are lower than the corresponding 
firm and time-varying average speed estimates of βit. But a comparison with the 
benchmark common speed model 3 suggests that the firm- and time- varying speed 
estimates of model 5 tend to lie in between those obtained from the common speed 
model (model 3) on the one hand and firm specific speed model (4) on the other. Note 
also that these time- and firm-varying speed estimates are more in line with Jalivand 
and Harris (1984) who found relatively higher adjustment rates for US manufacturing 
firms (56% for long-term and 61% for short-term debt). Given that we identify model 
(5) to be our preferred model, our analysis in this subsection is couched in terms of 
the average speed estimates βit obtained from the most flexible model 5.  
Estimates of βit vary across the sample countries and here we summarise our 
primary observations. First, while the average leverages are higher among firms in the 
worst affected countries, the latter tend to have lower average speeds of adjustment 
(relative to those in the least affected countries). Given that the institutions are weaker 
in the worst affected countries (see Table 1), this result could be taken as evidence of 
bad loans in the worst affected countries in our sample. Second, these speed estimates 
vary among the worst affected countries; Malaysia has the lowest average speed of   26
0.23 followed by Indonesia (0.42) and Thailand (0.50), while the estimate is much 
higher, e.g., 0.67 for the Korean firms. These inter-country differences in the average 
speeds of adjustment reflect the differences in the costs of adjustment among these 
countries. The average speed estimate increases somewhat as we exclude the zero-
debt firms (see further discussion below). The case of Malaysia is interesting to note 
here. While tighter institutional environment and greater access to market based 
finance have resulted in generally lower leverage (relative to other worst affected 
countries), the speed of adjustment in Malaysia falls significantly short of all other 
sample countries, thus questioning the effectiveness of debt recovery in the country.  
It is also important to highlight the differences in the adjustment behaviour of 
firms in the comparator countries, especially Singapore and Taiwan, countries those 
were least affected by the last crisis. Model (5) speed of adjustment turns out to be 
much higher for firms in these countries, suggesting lower costs of adjustment. Note 
also that the difference in speed estimate for more and less leveraged firms is 
minimum in these countries, thus suggesting a better allocation of credit in these 
countries (the contrast with Hong Kong is noteworthy though). To some extent, 
relatively higher speeds of adjustment in the least affected countries may also reflect 
their greater access on equity financing (see Table 1).  
Presence of Zero-debt firms 
There are some zero-debt firms in each of the sample countries (see Table 4). As 
expected, the average speed estimates for non-zero debt firms tend to be somewhat 
higher than the corresponding full sample estimates (see Table 10). Note also that the 
difference is highly significant among firms in Indonesia (20 percentage points) 
among the worst affected countries; in comparison, the difference is rather marginal 
(1-5 percentage points) among firms in other sample countries.   27
Effect of debt composition 
Some may argue that a greater use of short-term debt could be one important reason 
as to why average speed estimates are generally higher in East Asia than elsewhere. In 
order to check the validity of this proposition, we next examine the average speed 
estimates for firms with (a) short-term debt less than 5% and also (b) zero short-term 
debt (see columns (7) and (8) of Table 10). While this brings down the average 
Korean speed from 0.67 to 0.52 (similar effect is observed in all the least affected 
countries) as expected, the implied speed of adjustment barely changes in the other 
three affected countries, despite having high share of short-term debt. 
Effect of firm and leverage size 
Finally we compare the full sample speed estimates with those for firms in the top 
leverage quartile (Table 11). Indonesian and Korean firms have higher than full 
sample average speeds; Malaysian high debt firms however have significantly lower 
speeds of adjustment than the average, thus questioning the effectiveness of 
institutional regulations for debt payment and recovery.. In contrast, higher speeds of 
adjustments among Indonesian and Korean firms in the top leverage quartiles signify 
their lower cost of adjustment, as reflected in the comparison of effective interest rates 
in Table A2. The adjustment pattern is very similar when we compare speeds based 
on firm size. 
Speed estimates using net leverage  
In an attempt to understand the implications of financial constraint on the speed of 
adjustment, we shall finally use leverage net of cash flows as an alternative measure 
of leverage and estimate the average speed of adjustment (full estimates are shown in 
Appendix Table A4). A comparison of columns (4) and (5) in Table 10 suggests that 
the two sets of model (5) average speed estimates using total and net leverage   28
measures are quite comparable. Note however that the speed estimates using net 
leverage are somewhat higher, especially for the worst affected countries, the 
difference being largest in Indonesia and smallest for firms in Malaysia. In other 
words, the latter would highlight the case of relieving financial constraint for firms in 
the worst affected countries, as we take a/c of cash flow. The effect is however really 
marginal for firms in Singapore and Taiwan.   
 
4.6. Financial distress and sudden adjustment 
So far we have considered the case of smooth (optimal) adjustment process (a la 
Fisher Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; FHZ afterwards): firms deviating from 
lower/upper threshold of their target optimal leverage will adjust only when the 
marginal benefit of restructuring and getting back to the optimal leverage is equal to 
the marginal cost of restructuring. Clearly, the process of adjustment may not always 
be smooth and optimal for the financially distressed firms. In FHZ, Goldstein, Ju, and 
Leyland (2001; GJL afterwards) and Strebulaev (2007) firms restructure by levering 
up when they reach an upper threshold. In GJL and Strebulaev, the lower threshold is 
equated with default; at the time of restructuring firms' leverage jumps back to the 
optimal leverage and this is what we label as "sudden adjustment". Aspects of sudden 
adjustment could particularly be important in a situation of unexpected crisis as in the 
sample countries during the period of study, when things deteriorated suddenly; 
whether this sudden crisis could force distressed/defaulting firms to restructure 
immediately, would also depend on the institutional arrangements, among other 
things.   
Worldscope firms’ balance sheet data does not allow us to directly identify a 
defaulting firm or cases of bankruptcy. So we adopt an indirect approach to identify   29
the financially distressed firms. A common measure of a firm’s financial distress is 
the ratio of cash flow (CF) to current liability (CL), which is one type of liquidity 
ratio, linked directly to a firm’s financial constraints discussed earlier (see section 2). 
Provided creditors and debtors are paid at approximately the same time, the ratio 
suggests whether the business has sufficient liquid resources to meet its current 
liabilities. Using this liquidity ratio, one can classify sample firms into three types as 
follows:  
(type a) CL>CF and CF <=0 so that CF/CL is <=0 
(type b) CL>CF and CL>CF>0 so that 0<CF/CL<1 
(type c) CL<=CF so that CF/CL>= 1 
A summary of characteristics for these three types of firms are shown in Table 
11, which highlights a number of important observations. (i) Dependence on debt 
(relative to assets) is particularly high for type 'a' and 'b' firms, but especially so for 
the former. Similar trend is found for firms in the worst and the least affected 
countries; but the average leverage ratios for type a firms in the worst affected 
countries are almost double than those in the least affected countries. (ii) In contrast, a 
higher proportion of type c firms tend not to have any debt (compared to type 'a' and 
'b' firms in a given country), which in turn highlights their reliance on other source of 
funding among these firms (see Table 4). The proportion of zero debt type c firms is 
particularly high in Malaysia (37%) followed by Singapore (27%), Indonesia and 
Hong Kong (each 15%). (iii) Clearly ‘type a’ firms are not the most profitable ones as 
reflected in their negative profit rates (defined as earnings before interest and taxes as 
a share of total assets) in all countries except Malaysia (which has a very low but still 
a positive profit rate). In contrast, profit rates for type ‘b’ and ‘c’ firms tend to be 
positive with type c firms being the most profitable ones in any given country.    30
In general, we expect that financially distressed firms will be forced to adjust 
quicker, if adequate legal/institutional environment is in place. Table 12 reports the 
model 5 average speeds of adjustment estimates for type a, b, c firms, obtained using 
model 5 estimates presented in Table 9. While type a firms in all three least affected 
countries have higher than their full sample average speed of adjustment, the picture 
is rather mixed among the worst affected countries. In particular, type a firms in 
Malaysia and Thailand have less than their full sample average speeds while it is 
opposite in Korea and Indonesia (more in line with the firms in least affected 
countries). The contrast between Malaysia and Korea, for example, is worth 
highlighting here. Despite having better institutional framework in place, distressed 
Malaysian firms too tend to adjust its capital structure slower than those in Korea.  
The fact that financially distressed firms do not always have higher speeds of 
adjustment even in the worst affected countries highlights the lack of adequate 
regulatory environment in this region. In the post crisis period however type a firms in 
all sample countries tend to have higher than the full sample average speeds of 
adjustment  (the difference being minimum in Taiwan and maximum in Hong Kong); 
nevertheless, this seems to be a movement in the right direction. 
 
5.   Concluding Comments  
In the context of spectacular growth in the 80s and early 90s in East Asia, many firms 
in the worst affected countries indulged in some reckless capital structure behaviour. 
In this context, the present paper analyses the dynamic adjustment of corporate capital 
structure among the listed non-financial East Asian corporations during 1995-2002. 
Our analysis highlights some important features of credit markets in East Asia that 
remains little understood.    31
In order to understand the adjustment behaviour of the sample firms, we not 
only use the conventional partial adjustment models (with a common speed of 
adjustment for all firms and over time), but allow the speed of adjustment to vary both 
across firms as well as over time, using GMM on panel data. There is evidence that 
firms in the worst affected countries not only have higher leverages (being the result 
of high debt even in a situation of deteriorating assets), but also tend to have lower 
speed of adjustment than their counterparts in the least affected countries. This 
general ranking is robust to various alternative specifications and sample selections. 
The case of Malaysia is particularly interesting in this context: while by virtue of its 
rigorous institutional and legal environment and also access to market based finance, 
the country was successful to restrict leverages to a generally lower level, it was not 
so successful to ensure speedy adjustment of capital structure and was among the 
worst affected countries hit by the crisis.  
This analysis also identifies some important adjustment mechanisms: (a) 
adjustment speeds are greater for larger firms and firms in the top leverage quartile 
who tend to have access to cheaper credit, as reflected in a comparison of effective 
interest rates. (2) Firms with more cash flow tend to have faster speed of adjustment. 
(3) Firms with only long-term debt however have lower speed of adjustment. (4) 
Firms in countries with tighter regulations and access to equity finance tend to have 
lower leverage and higher speed of adjustment (with the exception of Malaysia). (5) 
In general financially distressed firms in most countries tend to have higher speed of 
adjustment, revealing cases of sudden adjustment; the latter is especially evident in 
the post-crisis period, highlighting the fact that lessons have been learnt after the 
crisis.    32
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Tables 
Table 1. A Comparison of Institutional Environment in East Asia 
 
  (1)  (2)         
 
                   
                     
                     
                     
                    
                    
                     
(3) (4) (5) (6) Sample mean 
 


































  Indonesia  3.98 4 2.5 7.16 2 0.47 0.46 - 0.28 0.08
Korea  2 5.35 3 6 8.31 2 0.46 0.46 3.449 0.37 0.44
Malaysia  2 6.78 4 9 7.95 3 0.37 0.31 1.111 2.01 1.14
Thailand  1 6.25 3 3.25 7.42 3 0.47 0.45 2.332 0.57 0.40
HongKong  8.22 4 10 8.29 4 0.24 0.24 - 1.96 1.08
Singapore  8.57 4 10 9.3 3 0.22 0.17 - 1.37 0.70
Taiwan  8.52 2 6.75 9.12 - 0.26 0.02 - -
 
[1] 1: Adequate; 2: Good (compatible with international standard). Source: Booth et al. 2001. 
[2] Market capitalisation and total values traded (as shares of GDP) are taken from Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). 
Columns (2)-(6) are taken from Driffield et al. (2007).   35 
 












                 
 
   
         
       
       
         
       
       
         
       
    
 
     
   
   
     
   
   
     









assets Lev Total  debt
Total 
assets Lev
Korea  Indonesia    Malaysia 
 
  Thailand   
  1994-96
 
Small 106.52  230.65 0.45 16.11 61.83 0.25 14.91 61.01 0.24 16.93 45 0.35
Medium 402.24 812.95 0.47 105.87 260.28 0.39 48.2 212.81 0.21 79.03 181.68 0.42
Large 2422.93  4954.06
 
0.5 595.81 1558.4 0.37 336.35 1279.1 0.22 527.25 1083.4 0.46
1997-98
 
Small 74.77 158.44 0.45 20.48 40.49 0.48 18.89 59.46 0.35 14.55 30.51 0.47
Medium 395.46 686.15 0.58 129.62 197.55 0.66 60.98 196.38 0.34 70.55 129.11 0.54
Large 2476.3  4281.28
 
0.58 731.53 1330.3 0.63 553.23 1608.8 0.31 685.86 1049.6 0.74
1999-02
 
Small 58.56 189.99 0.35 15.83 39.63 0.43 17.73 50.63 0.66 10.16 29.62 0.36
Medium 309.23 704.95 0.43 94.36 164.21 0.57 54.59 186.26 0.34 46.23 111.86 0.49
Large 2722.96  6583.14 0.47 606.27 1181.5 0.61 550.7 1552.7
 
0.33 581.33 982.02 0.62
Period Hong Kong 
 
  Singapore    Taiwan  
  1994-96
 
Small 10.3 38.98 0.24 4.94 23.27 0.23 17.21 101.77 0.17
Medium 27.97 104.85 0.24 16.1 77.06 0.19 44.51 199.84 0.21
Large 350.24  1482.57
 
0.24 135.22 697.41 0.2 260.71 929.8 0.27
1997-98
 
Small 13.07 40.88 0.29 3.94 21.72 0.18 19.48 106.58 0.17
Medium 25.43 97.8 0.26 18.5 73.51 0.24 57.6 229.68 0.23
Large 383.84  1498.66
 
0.25 203.06 857.6 0.25 353.59 1109.1 0.3
1999-02
 
Small 3.64 20.74 0.23 3.41 20.93 0.17 18.87 91.43 0.19
Medium 15.83 86.17 0.22 14.89 66.04 0.23 68.16 242.84 0.28
Large 461.44 1647.43 0.26 268.29 965.34 0.27 476.21 1537 0.33
                                                            36 
Table 3. Evolution of leverages across quartiles, worst affected countries 
 
                   
               
                         
                               
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                               
                             
                               
     
                   
                       
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                       
                       
Leverage quartiles 









Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1995 .09 .27 .41 .54 .18 .37 .50 .71 .02 .18 .35 .53 .14 .36 .53 .67
1996 .10 .28 .41 .56 .18 .37 .51 .70 .02 .19 .35 .55 .11 .37 .53 .69
1997 .08 .29 .42 .68 .16 .38 .51 .69 .02 .19 .37 .61 .07 .38 .55 .89
1998 .07 .28 .42 .86 .13 .36 .49 .84 .02 .19 .36 .79 .10 .38 .55 .95
1999 .04 .28 .42 .80 .15 .35 .49 .96 .02 .19 .36 .83 .09 .35 .54 1.00
2000 .06 .27 .42 .92 .13 .36 .50 .94 .03 .18 .35 .93 .09 .36 .53 1.01
2001 .06 .28 .42 .88 .14 .36 .50 .95 .02 .19 .36 1.17 .09 .34 .55 1.04
  2002 .07 .27 .40 .78 .13 .35 .49 .68 .02 .18 .36 1.54
 
.10 .36 .55 .86
Mean  .07 .28 .42 .75 .15 .36 .50 .81 .02 .19 .36 .87 .10 .36 .54 .89
St.dev  .02 .01 .01 .15 .02 .01 .01 .13 .00
 
.00 .01 .35 .02
 
.01 .01 .14







Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1995 0.03 .13 .25 .42 0.02 .12 .26 .44 0.07 .20 .32 .49
1996 0.02 .12 .24 .45 0.02 .13 .26 .44 0.07 .20 .32 .47
1997 0.02 .12 .25 .47 0.03 .13 .26 .44 0.06 .20 .32 .46
1998 0.02 .12 .24 .55 0.02 .13 .27 .46 0.05 .20 .31 .49
1999 0.02 .12 .25 .82 0.02 .12 .27 .51 0.05 .20 .32 .51
2000 0.02 .12 .25 .72 0.02 .13 .25 .48 0.04 .19 .32 .48
2001 0.01 .12 .25 .57 0.02 .13 .26 .51 0.04 .20 .33 .50
2002 0.01 .13 .24 .60 0.02 .12 .26 .56 0.05 .20 .32 .50
Mean  0.02 .12 .25 .57 0.02 .13 .26 .48 0.05 .20 .32 .49
St.dev  0.00 .00 .00 .14 0.00 .00 .00 .04 0.01 .00 .01 .01
Note: Four leverage quartiles are denoted respectively by Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4. St. Dev denotes the standard deviation of the quartiles. 
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 Table 4. Distribution of firms with short-term debt and zero debt across the sample countries 
 
  Mean Leverage  Long term debt as a 
share of total debt 
  firms with zero debt   
 All
firms 
















Profit rate  Firms (obs) 
Indonesia                 0.47 0.50  0.3998  0.3916 24 4. 0.09 1.2 0.20 107
(963) 
Korea                0.46  0.46  0.4584  0.4553 3 1 0.33 1.15 -0.01 196
(1764) 
Malaysia                    0.37 0.40 0.3773  0.3300 18 7 0.14 1.65 0.10 269
(2421) 
Thailand                      0.47 0.48 0.3526  0.2728 22 2 0.03 1.37 0.08 189
(1701) 
Hong Kong  0.24  0.26  0.3757  0.3296  19  4  4.23  1.8  -0.01  608 
(5472) 
Singapore                  0.22 0.24  0.3747  0.3290 16 3 0.56 2 0.11 367
(3303) 
Taiwan                   0.26 0.27 0.3840  0.3602 15 2 0.10 1.5 0.13 429
(3861)   38 
Table 5. Blundell-Bond level estimates of leverage (model 2) 
 
































































































































Sargan [p value]  0.185        0.311 0.246  0.209  0.400  0.247 0.361














































Corr (Y,Y ˆ )  0.78              0.68 0.59 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.59
   
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics.   39 
Table 6. GMM Levels Estimates with Initial Leverage (Model 2a) 
 Korea  Taiwan  Malaysia         Indo Thai Hong Kong  Singapore














































0.0014  0.0019 














































































Sargan [p value]  0.113  0.140  0.111  0.197  0.131  0.203  0.167 


























AR(2), [p value]  0.7635 [0.45]  0.9481 
[0.34] 
1.964 [0.05]  1.476 [0.14]  0.1003 
[0.92] 
1.452 [0.15]  2.115 
[0.03] 
Corr (Y,Y ˆ )
2  0.70              0.67 0.53 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.53
 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. Note that some of the AR tests here fail - this is due to the lack of the 
lagged dependent variable in the model.   40 
Table 7. GMM Estimates (first difference) of Partial Adjustment Model 1  
 
          Korea Taiwan Malaysia Indonesia  Thailand  Hong
Kong 
Singapore 




























































value                0.1829 0.2099 0.2191 0.1888 0.1117 0.3558 0.0875
Corr (Y,Y ˆ ) 0.37              0.38 0.10 0.29 0.40 0.06 0.19
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. 
w denoted estimates of the speed of adjustment that are significantly different from 1.   41 
Table 7 (continued).  GMM Estimates (first difference) of extended Model 3 
 
      Korea  Taiwan  Malaysia  Indonesia  Thailand 
 
Hong Kong  Singapore 









































































Sargan P value  0.1648              0.4968 0.1510 0.0692 0.0812 0.1660 0.3409
Corr (Y,Y ˆ )
2  0.47              0.55 0.10 0.30 0.43 0.23 0.34
 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. 
w denoted estimates of the speed of adjustment that are significantly different from 1.   42 
Table 8. GMM Estimates of Firm-varying Speed Model 4 
 
      Korea Taiwan  Malaysia  Indonesia  Thailand  Hong  Kong  Singapore
































































































































0.3053              0.2041 0.4461 0.0939 0.0654 0.1191 0.0920














) ˆ , ( Y Y corr
2  0.48              0.54 0.13 0.69 0.44 0.32 0.36
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. DC is the debt-coverage ratio while SR is the annual stock returns.  
* Di is a binary variable that takes a value 1 if  for at least 5 sample years and zero otherwise.  it it L L <  43 
Table 9. GMM Estimates of Firm- and Time- varying Model 5 
 
        Korea Taiwan Malaysia  Indonesia  Thailand  Hong  Kong  Singapore






























































































































Sargan                0.159 0.393 0.085 0.143 0.368 0.342 0.222














) ˆ , ( Y Y corr
2  0.52              0.56 0.14 0.74 0.56 0.46 0.36
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote the corresponding t-statistics. DC is the debt-coverage ratio while SR is the annual stock returns.  
* Dit takes a value of 1 if   and zero otherwise.  it it L L <  44 
Table 10. Comparison of Speeds of Adjustment in Alternative Models 
 
 
Full sample estimates  Selected sample estimates 













(1)                (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 
Model2          Model3 Model4 Model5 Model5 Model5 Model5 Model5 Model5 Model5
Indonesia 0.90                0.98 0.06 0.42 0.54 0.62 0.44  0.44  0.55 0.40
Korea                      0.81 0.88 0.32 0.67 0.72 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.77 0.80
Malaysia                      0.87 0.406 0.74 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.22
Thailand                      0.77 0.951 0.782 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.39
HK                      0.87 0.83 1.09 0.95 0.92 0.99 0.52 0.59 0.99 0.55
SPore                      0.81 0.96 1.06 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.97 0.67 0.95 0.83
Taiwan                      - 1.032 0.783 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.92 0.87
   45 
Table. 11. Selected Characteristics of Type a, b, c firms 
     Mean values  % of  







Lev.  SD/TD  Pft rt.  Zero 
Debt 
firms 
Indonesia           a  24   1.9  -0.36 0.80 0.63 -0.12 2
  b              69  1.75  0.34 0.39 0.59 0.12 4
  c              7  1.85  1.76 0.22 0.39 0.23 15
Korea           a  21   1.8  -0.60 0.69 0.54 -0.13 1
  b              75  1.9  0.20 0.40 0.55 0.08 1
  c              3  1.5  3.11 0.28 0.45 0.54 8
Malaysia          a  20   1.6  -0.26 0.92   0.02 2
  b             71  1.95  0.32 0.25 0.08 6
  c             9  2.01  1.72 0.08 0.12 37
Thailand           a  20   1.9  -0.45 0.77 0.73 -0.13 1
  b              70  1.8  0.31 0.41 0.32 0.09 2
  c            9  1.7  2.13 0.21   0.17 9
Hong Kong  a  26   2.00  -17.94          0.39 0.73 -0.50 10
  b            45  2.5  0.46 0.24 0.38 0.07 2
  c            29  2.2  60.24 0.11   0.20 15
Singapore            a  17   1.9  -0.36 0.36 -0.16 4
  b             78  2.2  0.33 0.20 0.07 5
  c             5  2.2  1.57 0.06 0.19 27
Taiwan            a  16   2.0  -0.55 0.38 -0.07 2
  b             51  2.3  0.45 0.30 0.05 1
  c             32 2.1  3.7 0.14 0.14 8
Note: Type a: CF/CL<=0; Type b: 0<CF/CL<1; Type c: CF/CL>=1.   46 
Table 12. Sudden adjustment? 
 
  Average speeds of adjustment 
  Korea    Indo Malay Thai      HK SPore Tai
Full sample   0.67  0.42  0.23  0.50  0.95  0.81  0.87 
Type a  0.68  0.55  0.16          0.47 1.19 1.21 0.90
Type a pre crisis  0.76  0.44  0.24          0.67 0.96 1.00 0.79
Type a crisis  0.64  0.48  0.21          0.55 0.85 0.99 0.89
Type a post crisis  0.69  0.57  0.34          0.36 1.45 0.95 0.92
Type b  0.65  0.42  0.24          0.53 0.69 0.75 0.87
Type c  0.60  0.33  0.19          0.45 0.23 0.45 0.82
Note: Type a: CF/CL<=0; Type b: 0<CF/CL<1; Type c: CF/CL>=1. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics (Means and standard deviations) of dependent and independent variables, full sample 
 

















































































































Note: Standard deviations are shown in the parentheses. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets while net leverage is the ratio 
of total debt net of cash flow to total assets. DC is the debt-coverage ratio (defined as Net Operating Income / Total Debt service.) while SR is 
the annual stock returns. Dit takes a value of 1 if  *  and zero otherwise. Q is Tobin’s Q defined as the firm’s market value as a proportion 
of total assets.  
it it L L <  48 
 
Table A2. Mean Comparison of Effective Interest rate (%) 
 






quartile      10.5 -2.329*
        others 30.3
Korea 
Top leverage 
quartile      11.19 3.197*
        others 26.46
Malaysia 
Top leverage 
quartile      8.9 -2.942*
        others 45.7
Thailand 
Top leverage 
quartile  9.1    -2.380*
        others 25.2
Hong Kong 
Top leverage 
quartile      8.01 -2.851*
        others 34.36
Singapore 
Top leverage 
quartile      5.24 -4.700*
        others 16.36
Taiwan 
Top leverage 
quartile      6.12 -2.568*
        others 10.34
Note: * denotes the level of significance at 10% or lower level.   49 
Table A3. Comparison of Residual Sums of Squares (SSR) in Alternative Models 
 
Countries 
(1) SSR for 
model 3 (common 
speed) 





Reduction in  
model 4 SSR 
(1)-(2) 
(4) SSR for 





model 5 SSR 
(1)-(4) 
Korea            28.85 26.18 9.25 27.17 5.82
Taiwan            3.41 3.26 4.40 3.23 5.27
Malaysia            1.23 1.18 4.07 0.85 30.89
Indonesia            1.32 0.678 48.68 0.51 61.39
Thailand            8.88 7.75 12.73 7.7 13.29
Hong Kong  9.66  8.99  6.94  6.67  30.95 
Singapore            0.84 0.81 3.46 0.804 4.17
All           12.79 21.69
Note: SSR is the abbreviation for residual sum of squares. Columns (3) and (5) calculate the % reduction with respect to column (1).   50 
Table A4. Estimates using net leverage as a measure of leverage 
 
Variable   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand Hong Kong Singapore  Taiwan 
0.003              -0.019 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.011 0.003 α 
(t-stat)  -0.10              -3.78 -0.34 -1.37 -0.71 1.52 -0.96
0.695              0.121 0.176 0.22 1.89 1.11 0.38 β0 
(t-stat)  1.05              2.07 1.72 1.66 2.03 3.1 2.4
0.246              0.879 0.174 0.762 0.067 0.1542 0.423 D 
(t-stat)  1.47              5.56 0.28 2.6 1.45 0.48 4.76
0.0627              0.293 0.573 0.078 1.116 0.166 0.086 Q 
(t-stat)  2.12              1.19 2.56 3.47 4.55 0.93 2.74
0.477              0.095 0.1007 0.06 0.131 0.014 0.005 Sales 
(t-stat)  1.82              1.28 1.68 1.25 1.74 0.51 0.081
0.0721              0.002 0.075 0.00025 0.059 0.021 0.005 DC 
(t-stat)  2.56              7.42 2.08 3.75 1.32 0.47 3.81
0.073              0.091 0.002 0.0001 0.511 0.018 0.001 SR 
(t-stat)  0.64              2.73 0.39 1.12 1.64 1.895 0.422
0.33              0.067 0.24 0.038 0.063 0.09 0.22 γ 
(t-stat)  1.37              6.66 1.38 0.8 1.688 3.89 6.19
Sargan  0.203              0.266 0.225 0.262 0.430 0.249 0.317
1.248              1.159 1.037 1.169 1.082 1.023 1.215 AR(1) 
(p value)  0.263              0.281 0.308 0.280 0.298 0.312 0.270
0.88              0.61 0.09 0.37 0.323 0.47 0.5 (   2 ) ˆ ,Y Y corr
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Appendix 2 
Definitions of Institutional Variables Used in Table 1 
 
Rule of the law indicates an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. 
This is an average of the month of April and October of the monthly index between 
1982-1995. The index ranges between 0-10 with lower score for less tradition for law 
and order. 
 
Risk of expropriation: ICR’s assessment of the risk of outright confiscation. This is an 
average of the month of April and October during 1982-1995. The value of the index 
ranges between 1 and 10 with lower scores for higher risks. 
 
Creditor’s rights: This is an index aggregating creditor’s rights. The index is formed 
by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions such as creditors’ consent or 
minimum dividends to file for reorganisation; (2) secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of their securities once the reorganization petition has been approved;. (3) 
the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of 
the reorganisation; or (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm. The index 
ranges between 0-4 with higher scores for higher rights. 
 
Shareholder’s rights: The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allow the 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the General Shareholders Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; 
(4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place or (5) when the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles the shareholder to call for an Extraordinary 
Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median). The index 
ranges between 0-5 with higher scores for higher rights. 
 
Efficiency of the judicial system: This provides an assessment of the efficiency and 
integrity of the legal environment as it affects Business particularly foreign firms 
produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corporation. It may 
be taken to represent investors’ assessment of conditions in the country in question. 
The index ranges between 0-10 with higher score for higher efficiency. 
 
 